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RECENT DECISIONS
Harrington2' the owner gave the agent the "exclusive sale" of his farm
for four months but the contract did not specifically preclude the
owner himself from selling. The Wisconsin Court held that under such
circumstances the owner himself could sell without liability where he
had no knowledge of the prior negotiations carried on by the agent. In
that case the agent had given no consideration and the Court refused
to construe the contract as one limiting the owner's right to sell. The
agent was free to act or not act under the circumstances and the Court
reasoned that it would be inconsistent with the idea of ownership to
preclude the owner himself from selling without liability unless clear
and unequivocal language to that effect was used. In the subsequent
case of Greene v. Minnesota Billiard Co. 22 the agent was given an ex-
clusive right to sell but the contract contained the stipulation that the
agent was to receive his commission "regardless of who negotiates the
sale." The owner sold the property and it was shown that the agent had
spent time and money in efforts to procure a purchaser, and the Court
held that the agent was entitled to his commission.
The Wisconsin Court's interpretation of contracts giving an exclu-
sive right to sell does not place an unreasonable burden on the agent
by forcing him tb expressly stipulate that a sale by the owner shall not
deprive him of his commission. In the absence of either type of exclu-
sive contract the requirement that the agent prove that he was the pro-
curing cause of the sale is the only reasonable method of determining
whether the agent is to receive his commission.
PAUL KRUMHOLZ
Evidence-John Doe and Grand Jury Proceedings -Plaintiff, in
his capacity as town chairman of the town of Lake, was arrested on the
charge of accepting a bribe. After the arrest, a magistrate in another
proceeding subpoenaed witnesses and conducted a John Doe hearing
into the matter. Plaintiff prayed for a writ of prohibition to restrain
the magistrate from further investigational hearings in the John Doe
proceeding. Held: writ denied. The Court stated that a writ of pro-
hibition is only issued to correct some grave abuse of power or when
the magistrate abuses his discretion, and will not issue in the absence
of a showing that the magistrate proceeded beyond his powers and
jurisdiction. State ex rel. Kowaleski v. District of Milwaukee County
et al., 254 Wis. 363, 36 N.W. (2d) 419 (1949).
This action involved a John Doe proceeding, rather than a Grand
Jury hearing, so that for clarity it becomes necessary to distinguish
between the two. A John Doe proceeding is a hearing conducted by a
21168 Wis. 217, 169 N.W. 603 (1918).
22 170 Wis. 597, 176 N.W. 239 (1920).
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magistrate in response to a petition or complaint of the district attorney.
or other person.' A Grand Jury proceeding differs basically in that it
is a hearing conducted by the jury, with neither the magistrate or the
district attorney present unless invited, and is not limited in scope
of inquiry to a petition or complaint but can cover an all embracing
field of alleged wrong doings.
The John Doe proceeding is used in Wisconsin as an extrajudicial
procedure. Testimony is taken by the magistrate who does not issue
a warrant until the conclusion of the proceeding. Peculiarly, the magis-
trate does not have to reduce the examination to writing for no party
is charged with a crime until the end of the hearing,2 and if a transcript
of the John Doe testimony is kept, a defendant's later motion to inspect
the record can be denied.3 The "John Doe" statute4 was first considered
in Wisconsin in State ex rel. Long v. Keyes.5 There the Court stated:
"... the language employed in framing the section must first be
consulted, and its ordinary meaning must govern its construc-
tion, unless doubtful or ambiguous. (1) Other witnesses than
the complainant may be examined on oath. (2) Such witnesses
must be produced by the complainant. He cannot 'produce' then
in any other way than to suggest their names to the magistrate.
If they come voluntarily with the complainant, he cannot be said
to produce them in any other way then to make them known to
the justice as witnesses who knew anything about the case. They
are produced as parties produce their witnesses in court. They
may come voluntarily, or on subpoena and on attachment if
necessary. . ." The magistrate ".... must proceed in some way
until facts are made known to him by witnesses under oath.
He has to judge the facts. He adjudicates upon them. If it
shall appear that any offense has been committed, the magistrate
shall issue the warrant."
A Grand Jury proceeding is also an extrajudicial procedure and the
jury convenes when ordered by a trial court.6 The court, before it can
institute such an investigation, must have definite information from
trustworthy sources that criminal acts forming a system of criminal
I Wis. STATS. 361.02 (1947).
2 State ex rel. Schroeder v. Page, 206 Wis. 611, 240 N.W. 173 (1932).
3 State v. Herman, 219 Wis. 267, 262 N.W. 718 (1935).
4 WIs. STATS. 361.02(1) (1947) "Upon complaint made to any such magistrate
that a criminal offense has been committed, he shall examine, on oath, the
complainant and any witness produced by him, and shall reduce the complaint
to writing and shall cause the same to be subscribed by the complainant; and
if it shall appear that any such offense has been committed the magistrate
shall issue a warrant reciting the substance of the accusation, and requiring
the officer to whom it shall be directed forthwith to take the person accused
and bring him before the said magistrate, or before some magistrate of the
county, to be dealt with according to law: and in the same warrant may
require the officer to summon such witnesses as shall be therein named to
appear and give evidence on the examination."
5 75 Wis. 288, 293, 44 N.W. 13, 15 (1889).
6 Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1934).
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violations of the law have been committed.7 In this type of proceeding
the jury is the sole judge and is not bound by the court's instructions,
and all the magistrate or district attorney does is to attend the hearings
when so required by the Grand Jury and examine witnesses in their
presence or give their legal advice on the nature of the offenses which
the Jury are likely to consider. The minutes of the Jury's proceedings
are not open to inspection of all persons." Defendants are properly in-
formed of the charges against them by indictment.9 These records are
treated as memoranda and can either be used to aid witnesses in their
present recollection or past recollection of the contents. 10
Both these procedures aid the administration of criminal justice by
ascertaining whether crimes have been committed. If the court has
jurisdiction it can give immunity to the witnesses. It seems the John
Doe proceeding may be more efficient in that it moves summarily and
is less expensive. A John Doe proceeding is of lesser scope and dura-
tion and generally is of a continuous nature, whereas a Grand Jury con-
venes at the convenience of the jurors and may drag over a long period
of time.
JoaN D. STEIN
Corporations - Disregard of Separate Corporate Existence- An in-
dependent theatre owner brought suit originally for treble damages
and an injunction against respondent and others for violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Decree was entered against respondent, and
subsequently respondent was charged with and found guilty of con-
tempt of court for a violation of that decree. The respondent appealed
from the contempt decree. The case was tried on the theory that re-
spondent was operating the Palace Theatre, and that R.K.O. Radio
Pictures was the only R.K.O. corporation involved. On trial respon-
dent had admitted this. In the contempt proceeding, for the first time
in the course of litigation, respondent attempted to show that another
wholly-owned subsidiary of R.K.O. than respondent operated the
Palace Theatre. Held: the defense of separate corporate entity was
raised too late, and cannot be a defense at the enforcement stage of the
litigation. Bigelow et al. v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 170 F. (2d)
783 (C.C.A. 7th 1949).
The separate entity fiction is in law true and necessary for many
of the business advantages associated with the corporate form of or-
ganization, such as capacity for perpetual succession, ability to acquire
7Rauphin County Grand Jury Investigation, 332 Pa. 289, 2 A. (2d) 783 (1938).
s Wis. STATS. 255.23 (1947) ; State v. Davie, 62 Wis. 305, 22 N.W. 11 (1885);
State v. Lawler, 221 Wis. 423, 267 N.W. 65 (1936).9 Havenor v. The State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N.W. 116 (1905).10 Ibid.
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or transfer property and do other acts in the corporate name, achieve
free transfer of ownership or membership, and exemption of stock-
holders from personal liability for debts of the business.
In certain kinds of situations the courts will not recognize separate
corporate existence. It is difficult to express generally the principles
involved in "piercing the corporate veil" and disregarding the corporate
fiction. Some writers feel that generalizations from the cases are any-
thing but satisfactory because the principles are not subject to general
definition.1 When it is remembered that some judicial decisions rest
on little more than a vague equitable urge to impose liability upon some-
one who has not agreed to but ought to pay2 it can be seen that the
principles controlling the application of the fiction do not lend them-
selves to precise expression. It is said that no general rule can be laid
down except that the corporate entity will be regarded "until sufficient
reason to the contrary appears."1
3
A few instances in which the corporate entity has been disregarded
will be noted: where the corporation is undercapitalized and deliberate-
ly kept judgment proof to obtain benefits through corporate operations
without assuming the obligations;4 where the corporate form of or-
ganization is adopted in an endeavor to evade a statute or to modify
its effect ;5 where the corporation is the agent, sometimes called the
adjunct or instrumentality of another ;6 where the corporation, though
properly organized, so mingled its assets with those of other legal per-
sons as to become indistinguishable as an enterprise ;7 and where it
would promote fraud or defeat justice.8 The organization of a cor-
poration for the sole purpose of avoiding personal responsibility is not
fraud justifying disregard of the corporate entity.9
The principal case illustrates another type of situation where the
corporate fiction does not have its usual legal effect. If the corporate
structure is a complicated one and separate corporate existence is a
defense in an action, it must be asserted in the beginning or it is waived.
This is manifestly just and equitable since it would not be proper to
permit a corporation to take up the court's time and that of the adverse
party through two or three lawsuits and then After losing, in a sur-
1 BERLE AND WARREN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 156 (1948).
2 Farm Security Administration, Department of Agriculture v. Herren, 165 F.
(2d) 554 (C.C.A. 8th 1948).
3 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Company, 142 Fed. 247, 255
(C.C.A. 7th 1905).
4 Weisser et al. v. Mursam Shoe Corporation et al., 127 F.(2d) 344 (C.C.A.
2d 1942).
5 Keystone Mining Company v. Gray, 120 F.(2d) 1 (C.C.A. 3rd 1941).
6 Taylor et al. v. Standard Gas & Electric Company et al., 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
7 Cities Service Company v. Koenecke, 137 Kan. 7, 20 P. (2d) 460 (1933).8 Telis v. Telis et al., 132 N.J. Eq. 25, 26 A.(2d) 249 (1942).
9 Gledhill v. Fisher & Company, 272 Mich. 353, 262 N.W. 371 (1935).
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prise move, contend that it was never really involved in the action. Said
the court in the principal case:
"The respondent now for the first time drags from the closet
the bare bone skeleton of an elaborate corporate structure to
show to the court that not the respondent but another wholly-
owned subsidiary of the corporation, of which the respondent is
also a wholly-owned subsidiary, operates the Palace Theatre,
notwithstanding common control of the entire corporate pyramid
through stock ownership and interlocking officers and director-
ates. The contention that under such circumstances the right
hand does not know what the left hand is doing is a bit specious.
The District Court, which was thoroughly familiar with the re-.
spondent's appearance in the other proceedings, very properly
looked past this ghost-like corporate figure and, viewing the mat-
ter realistically, recognized that after all one and the same group
was in control and operation of the Palace Theatre.
The respondent was the old familiar face the court had in mind
when it drafted its decree in which it intended to cover the re-
spondent as an operator of the Palace Theatre. Just as the court
believed when it entered its decree, 'It would be to subordinate
reality to legal form' to hold that the respondent did not operate
the Palace Theatre."
RIcIHARD B. ANTARAMIAN
Corporations -Dissolution of Solvent Corporation at Suit of Mi-
nority Stockholder - In an action by the personal representative of S.
Pemberton Penn against Pemberton & Penn, Inc., it was alleged that
the purpose for which the corporation was formed had failed, and the
prayer for relief demanded that the corporation be dissolved and its
assets distributed under court supervision. Pemberton & Penn had been
a closed corporation since 1917. The corporation bought tobacco to be
resold to Japan and in Europe. Due to the war both these markets
were closed. The corporation sold its priorities to other tobacco buyers
during the war, and showed a considerable profit for the duration. In
1945 and 1946, due to the uncertainty of the market, the board of di-
rectors did not actively engage in buying and selling. This action was
started in 1947. Held :the action was dismissed. The question of whether
a solvent corporation should be dissolved and its assets distributed is
within the sound discretion of the directors, and a court will not inter-
vene in absence of proof of bad faith or fraud on the part of the direc-
tors in continuing corporate existence. Penn. v. Pemberton & Penn. Inc.,
53 S.E. (2d) 823 ( Va., 1949).
Little more than a hundred years ago a court of equity intervened
for the first time in corporate management at the suit of a minority
stockholder." It was not until half a century later that a court deter-
' Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562 (Ch. 1828) ; 1 Russ. & Mylne 150 (Ch. 1828).
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